Within five days of the accident, Patrick experienced "Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome," a diagnosis indicating that his lungs had begun to fail.
Paralysis rendered him unable to use his abdominal muscles and he had aspirated contents of his stomach that were now lodged in his airway despite an implanted nasal gastric tube. The catastrophic injuries Patrick experienced made it virtually impossible for him to breathe on his own. Other injuries included a contusion and puncture of his lung, a head injury, fractured sinuses, and a broken hip. He had suffered a constellation of injuries, including a spinal column fracture that left him paralyzed from the chest down and a "flailed chest," a condition in which the ribs are broken in multiple places causing uneven chest wall movement during each breath. Patrick's condition was critical on his arrival at Robert Wood Johnson. Two separately administered tests indicated that defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) at that time was. He eventually consented to be tested approximately two hours after the accident. He was placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated, transported to the police station, and later taken to Robert Wood Johnson for a blood alcohol test. Three field sobriety tests were conducted. He had no injuries, but was "belligerent." Heistand believed defendant was intoxicated.
Bobin was treated and later released.Īt the accident scene, Officer Heistand smelled an odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, and noted that he was swaying from side to side and front to back. Emergency crews extricated the two using the "jaws of life" and transported them to Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital (Robert Wood Johnson). His passenger, Jocelyn Bobin, was semi-conscious. Patrick was making "gurgling" and "wheezing" sounds, and appeared *1084 to have difficulty breathing. The rear of the LeBaron was crumpled through to the rear tire and the backseat, and the convertible top was crushed. The officers found Patrick, still wearing his seatbelt, unconscious and slumped forward in the driver's seat. Two nearby police officers heard the collision and rushed to the scene. The Camry traveled over a curb and came to rest in a grassy area on the side of the highway. The LeBaron sailed over the curb and slid along the guardrail, crashing into a utility pole before it ultimately came to rest 152 feet from the site of impact. At approximately 11:42 p.m., a 1993 Toyota Camry driven by defendant struck the LeBaron from behind. On the evening of December 29, 1995, William Patrick, a sixty-six-year-old lawyer, was driving his Chrysler LeBaron in the right lane of northbound Route 1 in South Brunswick.
#Martin mpc 2d plan trial#
The facts of the horrific car accident in which defendant, Sonney Pelham, was involved are summarized from the trial record. We conclude that the jury may be instructed, as a matter of law, that a victim's determination to be removed from life support is a foreseeable event that does not remove or lessen criminal responsibility for death. It is beyond dispute that individuals have the right to self-determination in respect of medical care generally and, specifically, in respect of rejecting or removing life support devices or techniques.
decide all elements of the charged offense." State v. Specifically, the charge informed the jury that if it found "that the defendant's actions set in motion the victim's need for life support the causal link between the defendant's actions and the victim's death is not broken by the removal or refusal of life support as long as you find that the death was the natural result of the defendant's actions." The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial because, in its view, "the charge to the jury on intervening cause deprived defendant of his constitutional right to have the jury in a criminal trial. At trial, the court instructed the jury that a car-accident victim's voluntary removal from a respirator was legally insufficient as an independent intervening cause and thus incapable of breaking the chain of causality between defendant's acts and the victim's death. Defendant was convicted of second-degree death by auto, in contravention of N.J.S.A. This criminal appeal focuses on a disputed jury instruction involving the subject of causation. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. Susan Brody, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). *1083 Mark Paul Cronin, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Sonney PELHAM, a/k/a Zeke, Defendant-Respondent. 448 STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,